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Introduction 
When trying to accommodate a once-in-decades event in an urban area, host cities for the 
Olympic Games are often faced with the problem of redeveloping an established place 
usually an under-performing area. This is especially the case when the city tries to use the 
Olympics as an opportunity to enhance urban development. This all-too-often causes a 
change of land use on the site and in the surrounding areas close to the venues. Most of the 
past host cities experienced land use transformations: London, Beijing, Barcelona, etc. (Festa 
2012, and Lei & Marjolein 2009). Such change can drive urban development by introducing 
functions that are of higher economic and social efficiency as well as those that are missing 
in the area. But debates arise whether the Olympics benefit only the local community that 
accommodates the venues or whether the overall city may receive positive Olympic legacies. 
My research question is: what are the Olympics benefits to local communities as regards 
on-site and off-site impacts on land use change? 
In order to answer that question, this thesis examines how the land uses of adjacent 
properties changed before, during and after the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. The 
question is whether Olympic events contribute to urban land use development, how did land 
uses evolve, what are the impacts on local economic development, transportation 
infrastructure improvement, and public open space provision, and do local communities 
benefit from the Olympic legacies (If not, who is the receiving the benefits). 
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A good knowledge of these questions can help municipal governments and their planning 
departments better understand the local impact of the Olympic Games rather than just as 
benefits to the city as a whole. When planning for such events, it would be helpful if planners 
were aware of what land use transformations might take place during the process and what 
effects it might have. Either for image or national pride a city bids for international 
mega-events and holds an optimistic expectation of promising returns: better infrastructure, 
more open space, booming economic development, increasing job opportunities, enhanced 
city image and greater capital investment. But planners should bear in mind whether 
expectations are actually realized, and, if they are, what might simultaneously take place. In 
sense of that, knowing the Olympics effects on land use change may help us identify the 
benefit and costs, thus in turn help us to reflect on how should we plan for international 
mega-events such as the Olympics. 
 
Background 
The Olympic Games began in 1896 in Athens (Greece) when Pierre de Coubertin 
(France) created them by founding the first modern International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
in Paris in 1894 (Olympic.org 2014). Held at four-year intervals, the Olympics has become a 
global event so popular that it is now considered a festival of sportsmanship, cultural 
diversity, and peace (BBC: Primary History 2014). 
As the Games evolved over time, many cities saw them as an opportunity to achieve 
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planning goals or solve urban issues by taking advantage of the fact that holding the 
Olympics, somewhat considered as a manifest of national pride, can drive land use evolution 
which otherwise may take decades to accomplish (Kindel, Watkins, & Hasdal 2009). In the 
name of the Olympics, host cities may update infrastructure, improve public services, or 
accelerate real estate developments, which would hardly be possible without the Games. 
However, when it comes to the impacts of such a big event on land use changes at a local 
level is an open question: that is, do the local residents who originally live around the 
Olympic area in a host city really benefit from the Games’ legacy? 
When the first modern Olympic Games were held, the IOC chose Athens (Greece) as the 
host city in honor of its Greek origin. Ever since, each of the modern Olympics takes place in 
different city and country across the world. To hold an Olympics, cities have to go through 
two key phases nine years before the Olympics they would like to stage: 1) Applicant Phase 
and 2) Candidate City Phase (Olympic.org 2014). During the Applicant Phase, the city 
submits answers to an IOC questionnaire in the form of an Applicant File which will then be 
studied by a Working Group appointed by the IOC. The Applicant Cities are evaluated on the 
basis of 11 technical criteria: 
• Government support, legal issues and public opinion 
• General infrastructure 
• Sports venues 
• Olympic village(s) 
• Environment: conditions and impact 
• Accommodation 
• Transport concept 
• Safety and security 
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• Previous experience hosting sports events 
• Finance 
• General project 
In the second phase, usually four to six cities present themselves as candidates. They are 
required to prepare a Candidate File which contains the answers to a second round 
questionnaire along with specific plans to hold the Olympics ranging from “the Olympic 
Village, transport, security and accommodation to sports and venues, the environment, 
marketing and many more” (Olympic.org 2014). The Candidate File is reviewed by an IOC 
Evaluation Committee. After a series of presentations delivered by the candidates, a host city 
is selected by the IOC members. 
Beijing, like host cities in previous Games, took it as an opportunity for fast development 
in urban renewal. The city tied its Olympic agenda to long-term land use development goals 
(Au-Yeung 2009). In 2008, a total of 37 stadiums served the Games, among which 31 were 
located in Beijing, with 11 pre-existing, 12 newly built, and 8 temporary structures that were 
removed after the event (Appendix: Figure 1). Half of Olympic-related structures inside 
Beijing, including two main stadiums, Beijing National Stadium (used for opening and 
closing ceremony, field and track, and soccer games), Beijing National Aquatics Center and 
the Olympic Village, were located around Olympic Green in the north-west of Chaoyang 
District. This area has been dramatically changed by the 2008 Olympics from an 
under-developed village to a busy modern urban community with sports, cultural, 
recreational and business services.  
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Yet contradictions arose from the fact that the Olympic venues are not located in places 
that most need incentives for land use development because of insufficient public inputs 
during planning process that led to the overriding of local needs by governmental objectives. 
Additionally, opponents argued that the Beijing Olympic initiatives failed to function at its 
full potential, because some of the best practices of management and operation strategies 
didn’t survive the Games.  
 
Literature Review 
When the Chinese government and its planning authorities failed to adapt the 2008 
Olympic agenda to local needs, a disparity occurred between the development of the Olympic 
sites. Reflecting on the site selection process of the Beijing municipal government, evidence 
shows that there were four main issues: 1) inadequate compensation to the displaced residents 
who moved out of the Olympic site, 2) insecurity and lack of alternative housing for evicted 
renters, 3) cultural heritage protection and displacements, and 4) housing rights violations set 
to continue after the Olympic Games (Fowler 2008). 
Given the current location, many commentators consider the 2008 Olympic site 
problematic in its planning process with disappointing post-Olympic effects. In his Gaining 
from olympic games legacy on land use improvement: a study on Beijing 2008 games, 
Au-Yeung (2009) chose three different forms of legacies that are distinguished from each 
other in user groups, ownerships, and location to further examine their contributions and 
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damage to the land use development of Beijing: 1) the Olympic Green (the area containing 
the main stadiums), 2) Chaoyang Park Beach Volleyball Ground (a temporary Olympic 
venue); and 3) Beijing Workers’ Stadium (an existing stadium renovated for the Games).  
Key findings are: 1) the Olympics changed the land use of the three chosen sites, leading 
to further disparity of urban development in the city, 2) the benefits were contained in a small 
area around the venues, while they should have been channeled to other parts of the city, 3) 
although not directly impacted, the under-performing south Beijing neighborhoods would 
have been better-off through the development of public infrastructure extended from Olympic 
area, such as public transportation systems, and 4) there was a lack a public involvement in 
the land use planning process during preparation of the Games and public participation was 
limited as far as the stakeholders. 
A similar study of East London addressed the state-led gentrification issues that took 
place during and after the 2012 Games in London (Watt 2013). Although some believe that 
the gentrification might occur because of the national economic trend and the urban 
development evolution (Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2008), it is argued that gentrification in East 
London was largely correlated with the 2012 Olympics.  
Watt (2013) reviewed government initiatives that aimed at turning the Olympic village 
into residential units in an affordable manner but failed to meet the housing need of potential 
working-class (Inside Housing 2012a). The Olympics aggrevated the gentrification problem 
by accelerating the rise of housing price and replacing existing locally-available jobs with 
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new Olympic-related jobs that were typically not available to low-income, industrial manual 
working class because they lack the necessary skills. Physical redevelopment for the Games 
facilities required that existing affordable housing and community facilities be removed or 
replaced, resulting in even higher housing prices (Bernstock 2009, Davis & Thornley 2010, 
and Raco & Tunney 2010).   
 
Research Design 
The object to study is land use change and its impacts on the surrounding neighborhoods 
in Chaoyang District, Beijing. The data needed to answer this question included municipal 
planning visions, land use information, evidence of infrastructure improvements, and 
economic indicators.  
Land use information, including how the Olympic area was used before the event and 
what it has been transformed into, answers the question of what changes took place. The 
information was collected on and off site by visiting the study area and by using satellite 
maps to identify what the properties were zoned as before and after the Games. The “adjacent 
neighborhoods” cover a quarter mile buffer from the venues. In this part there is a study of 
the current master plan of the host city to identify the specific position of Olympic venues 
and the surrounding areas in the hierarchy of the city, the municipal government’s short-term 
and long-term vision for the area, and how the city plans took advantage of the Games to 
achieve their planning goals.  
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To understand the city’s planning vision, I conducted three interviews with urban 
planners in Beijing Municipal Institute of City Planning & Design and Tsinghua University, 
including one interview with a planner who was on the commission team that held an 
international competition for the plan and design of the Olympic Green and Forest Park for 
the 2008 Olympics. 
Accompanying the land use change is often infrastructure improvement. The data needed 
was public transportation system extension or development (new subway stops during and 
after the Games), and culture and sports facilities improvement (new parks, public open 
spaces, convention centers). Studying Beijing’s subway and bus maps identified how the city 
developed its public transportation system: subway line extension and new metro/bus routes. 
The result of such land use changes accompanied by infrastructure improvements could 
be rising land values and increasing real estate investments. The data will answer the question 
of what are the effects of the land use change triggered by the Olympics. Statistics for land 
values, by districts are open to the public and can be extracted from Beijing Statistical 
Yearbook, but may not be at the local level as defined in this research. 
Data on real estate investments explains if the 2008 Olympics had an effect on the city’s 
real estate market. The data covers ten years from 2001 to 2010, from the bidding stage to the 
post-Olympic period. Four indicators are considered relevant because they are most relevant 
to the Beijing Master Plan (2004-2020) and the new functions added to the area: the total real 
estate investment, the investment in residential units, in offices, and in retails. Only data of 
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Beijing and Chaoyang District is available in Beijing Statistical Yearbook (Beijing Municipal 
Bureau of Statistics 2011). 
Interviews with business owners gathered data from the local individuals about how they 
are doing with the evolution in land use at community level. There were eight walk-in 
interviews with business owners. The interviews informed us of local business owners’ 
opinions on the issue, which offers an incremental perspective. 
Yet it is entirely possible that the population shift around Olympic venues might not be 
solely affected by the rapid development for organizing a mega-event but a trend that has 
already been taking place because of the city’s planning goal. This possibility required a 
careful study of the context, being the demographic trend, development projects in history, 
and governmental initiatives to stimulate such development.  
Conclusions were drawn from an analysis of collected data and information. They 
include a before-and-after comparison of land use maps, calculation of demographic and 
socioeconomic factors growth rate, and illustrations of infrastructure improvements. Theses 
data answer what changes took place and how. The analysis of interviews provided 
information of what caused such changes and whether they were considered positive or 
negative from both the city’s and local people’ perspectives. 
 
Site Selection 
In the late 1990s, the Beijing municipal government began to prepare for the 2008 
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Olympic Games. The current location for the core area for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games 
was chosen by “Planning and Coordination Office for Beijing 2008 Olympics Bidding”, a 
planning office established in 1999 by the Beijing municipal government and the National 
General Administration of Sports. During the designation there was fierce debate about 
whether Walicun would be the best location (Ma 2001 August). The debate primarily 
concerned two candidate sites: Walicun, the current location, and Yizhuang, which is in the 
southeast of the city (Appendix: Figure 2).  
Some planning officials believed that choosing Yizhuang, an industrial land with weak 
economic base and scarce public service supply, was more justified because the southeast of 
the city was in greater need of incentives for economic development that could have been 
accelerated by the Olympics. In over a half century, the southern portion of the city has had 
high poverty rates and long-term downturn of economic development (Ma 2001 September). 
On the contrary, Walicun is located in Chaoyang District which had already planned for a 
commercial center (Appendix: Figure 3). If Beijing saw the 2008 Olympics as an opportunity 
to a build new city center of commercial and public activities, the concern was that it would 
lead to redundant construction to locate the venues in an area that already had one 
commercial center (Peng 2001). 
Advocates of Walicun justified the decision by claiming that Yizhuang was not “ready”. 
“…the south city is less advantaged in real estate development, while by having the Olympics 
in Walicun the spill-over impact could bring the economic benefit and infrastructure 
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improvement to the whole city, including the south…” said Mingtao Li, the chief architect of 
Beijing Institute of Architecture Design who participated in designing the stadiums.  
 
The Selection Process 
The site selection process consisted of four stages. From the first stage to the third, 15 
alternative sites were reduced to 4, which were Walicun, Dingfuzhuang, Fatou, and Yizhuang. 
Among the four locations, only Yizhuang is in one of the city’s southern districts, Daxing; 
the other three are all in Chaoyang District in the inner northeast. Walicun sits on the north 
extension of Beijing’s 7.8 km (4.85 miles) central axis that goes from Yongdingmen Gate in 
the central city to Zhonggulou in the northern city. In the last stage, only Walicun and 
Yizhuang remained as options, and the municipal government eventually chose the current 
location over Yizhuang.  
The major reason was to “better impress the IOC” (Zhu 2008, Jia 2007). When bidding 
to host the 2008 Games in 2000, Beijing feared that Yizhuang would make the city a weak 
candidate. “…(the 2008 Olympic Games) was not only an international sport event, but also a 
chance to create a better city image…” said Zhimin Sun, planner and engineer of Beijing 
Institute of Architecture Design (BIAD), who was on the planning team for Beijing 2008 
Olympic Games. “…It was the city’s dream to hold the Olympics, and it could not afford to 
risk losing the bid. At that time, from the city’s standpoint, the north city seemed a better 
choice. Walicun was in a neighborhood with a more robust economic environment; it was 
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better facilitated by public service; the culture was richer because of the central city 
location… ” 
In fact, there were four major reasons to chose Walicun over Yizhuang: the city’s 
planning vision, economic considerations, infrastructure supply, and political propaganda. By 
having the Olympics located in the north city, it could extend and enhance to urbanization of 
the north end of Beijing’s central axis, thus conforming to the city’s master plan. Besides, 
located in a community well-connected to the central city, it could create a new center of 
public activities and a better city image. Third, the neighboring areas were highly urbanized 
and thus had sufficient public infrastructure and transportation service (Document of 
International Competition for Conceptual Planning and Design of Beijing Olympic Green 
2002). Also, the event was considered political propaganda for the government. 
 
Four Reasons 
The two locations in the last round of selection process were quite different from each 
other. The site where the Olympic Green now stands used to be called Walicun, a reserve 
zone for urban development. It belongs to Datunxiang community and Walixiang community, 
which was agriculture land until designated for science and research use in 1960 by the city. 
Several institutes affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences settled their offices and 
labs on the perimeter of Walicun. In the following decades, the city could not decide what to 
do with the land, thus hardly any development plans targeted this place. After long-term 
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vacancy, it gradually became an urban settlement of immigrants and low-income workers (Li 
2008) (Appendix: Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Maps of Walicun (currently the Olympic Green) in 2001 (left) and 2014 (right). 
Data source: Google Earth 
 
 
At the same time, the surrounding communities became a middle-class residential area. 
In addition, it was located in the north part of Beijing, where urban development had always 
been favored, providing a well-connected road network and robust economic environment 
around the site. Although Walicun itself was a huge clog of urban village, it did have an 
advantage of sitting in a more economically vibrant context with potential of better-served 
transportation system. With the expected developments brought by the mega-event, the 
village could be opened up to the city road network and could catch up economically with the 
rest of the community. 
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Yizhuang, on the contrary, is in one of the southern districts, Daxing. Before 2000, 
Yizhuang was a town under Daxing District’s administration on the outskirt of Beijing with 
small manufacture industries. There was only one major road connecting it to the core city 
and public services were scarce. In 2000, the city designated Yizhuang as the Beijing 
Economic-Technological Development Area, which was directly under Beijing municipal 
council, standing parallel to Daxing District in terms of government hierarchy. The city 
strengthened Yizhuang as a manufacturing center, using it to attract Fortune 500 and large 
international brands. Although it was an example of a successful “technological park” 
development, at the time when Olympic site selection proceeded, Yizhuang was a suburban 
area lacking economic development and municipal infrastructure. Even after the designation, 
the Planning and Coordination Office worried that it was still too “manufacture” to look good 
as an Olympic site. Unlike the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park that used to be manufacturing 
area in East London, Yizhuang was becoming a manufacturing center in 2000 which the 
Office considered unfit for IOC’s vision for a green Olympics. 
Walicun was preferable from the planning perspective, because it is located on Beijing’s 
south-to-north central axis that is not only an axis of the symmetrical physical structure of the 
city but also a corridor of urban development. The Beijing Master Plan envisions this area as 
the new center of economic development and cultural activities (Beijing City Master Plan 
2004-2020, 2006). Building Olympic venues was believed to be an accelerator of the Master 
Plan by increasing the number of employers and property values. It was also envisioned to be 
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a local attraction by providing the public space, hosting big conference events and 
accommodating art performances. Locating the Olympic core site in Walicun would be in 
accordance with the city’s master plan.  
While it is on the outskirt of the city and may not fit into the city’s vision for enhancing 
the central axis, Yizhuang actually is part of a bigger regional plan, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei 
Urban Development Corridor (Appendix: Figure 5). The Corridor aims at catalyzing 
urbanization along its route and extends from the suburbs of Beijing, passing Tianjin, which, 
because of relatively cheaper housing and booming service industries, is now more and more 
often seen as an alternative to Beijing, all the way to cities in the west of Hebei Province. In 
this sense, Yizhuang needed government incentives to be integrated into the bigger plan. 
The second reason to choose Walicun is that it had a more robust economic environment. 
Compared to Yizhuang in the 2000s, the town with manufacturing factories, many of which 
were small workshops with low productivity, Walicun was in a more mature urban context 
with science and research institutes. It was surrounded by middle-class communities with 
clusters of high-end shopping centers, chain stores and local businesses. The major industries 
in Walicun in 2000 were institutional, retail and food (Li 2008). Such a combination could 
serve the mega-event. Plus, the Planning and Coordination Office proposed this area to be 
Beijing’s new convention-leisure center with enhancement of commercial and cultural 
activities. This type of urban development plan was also encouraged by the IOC as 
sustainable planning. 
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Another argument the government made to justify Walicun is that it had better 
infrastructure than Yizhuang. The Olympic site is located in neighborhoods with 
well-connected road networks, adequate public transportation, sewage systems, and 
municipal service facilities. Before the 2008 Olympics, the site was surrounded by a 
commuter road to the south (North 4th Ring Road) and two collector road (Beichen East Road 
and Kehui Road), while Yizhuang was connected to the core city by only one arterial road. 
Besides, Yizhuang did not have an urban environment that could support the Games without 
having massive redevelopment projects. 
Finally, designation of Walicun was more or less a political propaganda. At the 
beginning of the 21st century, China was trying to establish a positive image by presenting 
Beijing as an international modern city. The Olympics was a perfect opportunity. Before 
2008, the number of foreign tourists who traveled to China had been constantly increasing 
from 16.9 million in 2004 to 26.1 million in 2007, almost 1.5 times of growth (The Yearbook 
of China Tourism Statistics 2013). With an influx of international travelers, the core site of 
the Games was considered more like a display of the city’s culture and life. The current site is 
to the north of the China Ethnic Museum and the old stadiums of the 1990 Asian Games (Zhu 
2008). The north is adjacent to the city’s green belt and later transformed into the Olympic 
Forest Park to accommodate leisure and recreational activities. All factors together rendered 
Walicun as a perfect demonstration of Beijing’s culture and life.  	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Impacts posed by the Olympic site 
The selection of 2008 Olympic site induced a drastic land use change of Walicun, which 
impacted on the local community’s and the city’s economic development as well as 
infrastructure improvements. The plan faced two major disputes: 1) the venues were not 
located in places that most needed incentives and 2) the plan failed to function at its full 
potential. One can easily find Internet pictures of underperforming Olympic venues of 
Beijing, some in bad condition with low usage rates, others simply abandoned. Even 
stadiums kept in good shape, for example, the national stadium (also called the Bird Nest) 
and the national aquatic center, are only used for mega-performances or seasonal sport 
activities that have little connection with the local people (Lim 2012).  
The IOC has long been promoting sustainability planning of Olympic Games as it 
realizes that the world-celebrated sport event can be catalyst of urban development and many 
host cities want the games to create long-term legacies rather than just 16 days of sports 
feasts. In doing so, the IOC has encouraged each host city to define and propose their 
objectives, long-term strategies and visions. Beijing proposed improvements in education, 
volunteerism, public health, accessibility, transport infrastructure, venues, cultural 
preservation, and environment (IOC 2013).  
Theses goals achieved, the city as a whole would benefit from the games, however, 
whether the local community would receive any of the benefits remains a question. For 
example, venues are tourism attractions, and one cannot safely assume that local business 
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revenue has increased. In fact, local business owners expressed disappointment when talking 
about the effect of the growth of tourists on their revenues. Transport infrastructure has been 
improved to the site and in the surrounding neighborhoods, but failed to give its full benefit. 
Take transportation for instance, after building up a new road network that connects to the 
rest of the city, the operators of the Olympic venues shut down the roads in several blocks 
where mostly visited by tourists for safety reasons, thus creating an isolated island where no 
private vehicles can pass except for those of the staff.   
 
Land Use Evolution 
By locating the Olympics in Walicun, the land use of the site has been changed 
dramatically, creating new blocks with new forms of commercial uses. The area used to be 
designated a preserve zone for future development, but has been occupied by low-income 
residents since it was vacant (Appendix: Figure 6). Despite that it is located in the center of 
city, with well-developed urban surroundings, the place itself is isolated from the rest of the 
community. Walicun was enclosed with a clear boundary where all municipal roads stopped 
and only narrow streets constructed by Walicun residents led into the area. No public 
transportation linked it to the rest of the city; residents in the preserve zone traveled by 
bicycles or private motor vehicles. It was a huge mass in the center of Beijing, with small, 
low-profit businesses such as waste paper treatment stations (Li 2008).  
As the plan for the 2008 Olympics was implemented, the place was reorganized into 
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superblocks that were much bigger in scale compared to the surroundings and that 
accommodated new commercial activities (Appendix: Figure 7). The core area became the 
Olympic Green; on each side there are office buildings, a convention center, franchised 
department stores, hotels and museums. Apart from commercial spaces, there were several 
cultural and educational facilities under construction in 2015, adding more institutional uses 
to the site. The new parcels are large commercial and institutional blocks whose targeted 
users are not necessarily the local residents, creating a clear boundary between the Olympic 
site and the surrounding neighborhoods (Appendix: Figure 8). 
 
Local Economic Development 
Beijing 2008 Olympics cost more than fourteen billion US dollars in total, including 
twelve billion US dollars in non-Olympic specific expenditure and two billion US dollars in 
sports venues and Olympic village (Brunet & Zuo 2008). As the most expensive Olympics in 
history, Beijing Olympics was considered by the city as main driver of Beijing’s economic 
development for the coming years (Beijing Olympic Games Impact Abstract 2010). Since the 
city won the bid in 2001, Beijing’s GDP has been driven up largely because the municipal 
government’s investment in fixed assets and the trend was expected to continue after the 
sports event (Lu 2006).  
One of the economic impacts of 2008 Olympics Games was that the property values 
increased. The city aimed at promoting real estate development in the area by creating public 
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goods: creating public open space in Olympic Green, upgrading public transportation, and 
adding street furniture. The city also leased out most of the commercial buildings around the 
Olympic site as hotels, offices and retail, which were used to accommodate Olympic-related 
staff such as the press media. Easy access to core city via roads and public transportation 
made the site preferable to investors. Apart from commercial buildings, the city resold the 
Olympic village housing as residential units to the public after 2008 (Figure 9). Immediately 
after being released to the market, the price of Olympic village nearly doubled within one and 
a half year from ¥15,000 per square meter ($225 per square foot) to ¥30,000 per square meter 
($450 per square foot) (Zhang 2008).  
Figure 9. The Olympic village housing resold as residential units 
Photographed by the author 
	  
Beijing’s overall real estate investment was rising since the early 21st century (Figure 10) 
and was accelerated by the planning and construction for the Olympic Games from 2001 to 
2007, and continued to grow at similar rate in 2010 after two years of temporary stagnation 
(Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics 2011). Just as the city has expected, staging the 
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Olympics was a manifestation of the city’s fast growth of real estate development, however, 
due to the Post-Olympic Effect, which resulted from lack of investment, the real estate 
market cooled off for two years after 2008 (Tang & Yao 2012).  
Figure 10. Real Estate Investment in Beijing from 2001 to 2010 (unit: ¥ billion) 
Data source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook 2011 
	  
Another economic impact was on local businesses. There are three forms of commercial 
activities: local businesses that are scattered around Olympic Green, onsite retailing, and big 
franchised businesses (mostly hotels) on the perimeter of the site. Local businesses refer to 
those that are owned and run by those who live in the neighborhood. Theses form of business 
are represented by food and drink stores (groceries and restaurants) and local service 
businesses (laundries). Onsite retailing is owned and operated by a contractor, Beijing 
Inno-Olympic Group CO.LTD (Inno-Olympic), who signed with the municipal government a 
lease of land entitlement. The main form of franchised businesses is chain hotels, 
accompanied by mixed-use commercial space with retail, offices and serviced apartments.  
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Although the Olympic Green is among the most visited landmarks in Beijing, it does not 
necessarily mean that the local economy is enhanced. Rather, it is the large franchises that 
benefited the most by locating themselves near the Olympics site after the new land use 
proposal was implemented. Beijing North Star Industrial Group Limited Liabilities Company 
(North Star) bought land entitlement of almost all the parcels in the north of the site. They 
also hold several southern parcels including one cluster of hotels and two office buildings 
(Figure 11).  
Figure 11. Hotels (left) and office buildings (right) owned by North Star 
Photographed by the author 
 
Meanwhile on-site retailers are underperforming (Li 2011). The Beijing municipal 
government established Inno-Olympic that is responsible for maintenance and operation of 
onsite commercial spaces. Inno-Olympic created an underground shopping center inside 
Olympic Sports Center Station on subway line 8 that began to recruit tenants in September 
2011. The shopping center was expected to be at full occupancy by the end of 2011. However, 
more than 80% of the retailing space was still vacant in 2015 (Figure 12). Part of the reason 
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is that most people come to the site for tourism, not for shopping; another reason is that 
because tourists (including day-trippers from other districts in Beijing and those from other 
cities) consist of visitors to Olympic Green, they create a demand for food industries and 
tourism-related retailing. The need is specific because most visitors don’t spend extra time in 
Olympic Green except for visiting the stadiums, thus it is hard to keep people on site and 
spend more money on shopping.  
Figure 12. Xin’Ao Shopping Center in Olympic Sports Center Station on subway line 8 
Photographed by the author 
 
Local business owners didn’t see much improvement (Figure 13). During the interview 
with one grocery shop owner in the neighborhood next to the Olympic Green, he expressed 
discontent of his revenue, claiming that little increase was achieved. “Property value has been 
rising, but that has nothing to do with me.” He said, “there have been more visitors, but they 
don’t necessarily come to spend money in my shop… The major customers are still local 
residents who live nearby.” 
 	  
 	  	  	  	  
24	  
Figure 13. Local cigarette and liquor store 





In the late 1990s, the city overhauled its transport system that was organized around 
three concentric arterial ring roads (the 2nd Ring Road to the 4th Ring Road) and two subway 
lines (Subway line 1 and 2) (Appendix: Figure 14). In preparing for the Olympics, all 
potential host cities were required by the IOC to demonstrate their ability to efficiently 
accommodate the need for movement of millions of incoming visitors, athletes and the press. 
Thus began a new story of Beijing‘s transport system (Ong 2004). 
Beijing vastly expanded its transportation infrastructure to improve local, regional, 
national and international connections. The Plan emphasized local transport improvements on 
connecting roads that were once cut off by Walicun and enhancing public transportation 
systems (Beijing Olympic Action Plan 2002). 
There are three arterial roads and four collector roads that run through the Olympic 
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Green, consisting of a new street grid. All arterial roads are beneath the site, and the four 
collector roads are above-ground. The purpose was to facilitate the traffic within the, which 
defines the urbanized area in Beijing (Bai 2008). However the above-ground roads are fenced 
to keep private vehicles outside the Olympic site for “security reasons”. “The Inno-Olympic 
is the operator (of the Olympic Green). It closes the road access and puts security check 
station at several gates.” Said Mr. Zhimin Sun (Appendix: Figure 15). The National Stadium 
S Road, National Stadium Road and National Stadium N Road are restricted to staff vehicles 
only. Although the site is gridded in the same pattern with the road network off-site, there is 
no traffic through the site. 
Figure 15. On-site road ends closed and the security check point 
Photographed by the author
 
The same situation applies to the 4.5-meter (2.8-mile), three-lane underground circuit 
around Olympic Green connecting surroundings buildings underground space and the north 
and south arterial roads. Initially the circuit was planned to channel traffic from arterial roads 
to collector roads, and then lead to the structures and stadiums inside the Olympic Green so 
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as to least interfere with pedestrians. The plan was never realized because the property rights 
and management rights belong to Inno-Olympic, the builder, not the municipal government. 
Therefore, the city is not authorized to open the tunnel circuit (Zhang 2012). As a result, the 
area still retards traffic flows like it did before 2008. 
Public transportation has been greatly improved due to the city’s efforts in constructing 
subway lines and light rails (Shen 2014). The city had only two subway lines before 2000 
(Subway Line 1 and 2). In 2003, a Line 13 that linked the northern residential areas to the 
central city was put into service. Years before 2008, Beijing Mass Transit Railway Operation 
Corporation Limited, a city-owned company that operates Beijing subway lines, continuted to 
build new subway lines and renovate previously established stations (History of Beijing 
Subway 2011). In 2008, Subway Line 8, a new line that makes stops at the Olympic Green, 
began to operate. Initially the new subway line was opened to meet the specific need of the 
Olympics, with only a section of the line in operation, while, after the Olympics, Line 8 was 
extended at both ends to 26.6 kilometers (16.5 miles) with 17 stops, turning from Olympic 
Line into a subway line that links the north and south city. In 2017 Line 8 will be extended to 
45.6 kilometers (28.3 miles) with 35 stops, connecting to Daxing District. The number of 
Beijing subway lines increased from two in 2001 to eight in 2010 (Appendix: Figure 16). To 
increase ridership, the municipal government put price controls over subway tickets, which 
ceased in January 2015. 	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Public Open Space and the Reuse of Venues 
The construction of the Olympic venues brought public open space that was missing to 
the neighborhood (Figure 17). The Olympic Green is designed with a 50-meters (164-feet) 
wide open space from the south end to the north end of the site, symbolizing Beijing’s central 
axis (Beijing 2008 International Competition for Landscaping of Forest Park and Central 
Zone in Olympic Green 2004). With an enormous scale, the 1.3-kilometer (0.8-mile) axis is 
both beneficial and problematic. 
Figure 17. The south-north open space 
Photographed by the author 
 
The benefit is the provision of huge public open space in the center of the city. Most of 
the surrounding neighborhoods are poorly supplied with open space, which makes the 
Olympic Green especially valuable. Within a 5-kilometer (3.1-mile) distance to the east lives 
a population of 400,000 to 500,000, only a few of which has access to public sport facilities 
and green spaces (Wu 2006). The site instantly became popular among local residents and 
day-trippers who visit the convention center on-site and for sightseeing.  
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However, it has been argued that the design is out-of-scale, greatly retarding visitors 
from enjoying the open space. “… The scale is massive. You can hardly walk from one end 
to the other with comfort.” Said Mr. Sun. Along the central axis street furniture such as 
public seats is insufficient, making it even more difficult for pedestrians to walk around. 
According to Beijing 2008 International Competition for Landscaping of Forest Park and 
Central Zone in Olympic Green, the scale was decided by the estimated amount of visitors in 
2008; after the Olympics the open space could be used to stage mega-performances. 
Human-scale planning and design was absent from the beginning.  
Another legacy is the venues. Beijing Olympics utilized 37 stadiums, 31 of which are 
located in the city. Except for Wukesong Baseball Stadium that was demolished, Laoshan 
Bicycle Moto Cross (BMX) Venue and Chaoyang Park Beach Volleyball Ground that were 
abandoned and await future disposal, most of the stadiums are struggling with low usage 
rates and low-profit performance.  
The National Stadium (the “Bird Nest”) and the National Aquatic Center (the “Water 
Cube”), for example, gained sizable profits in the years following the Games from entrance 
fees paid by visitors. After 2010, however, theses profits gradually became insignificant 
compared to the costs of maintenance and operation. The size of the stadiums prevents them 
from being rented for medium and small events because profits collected by small-to-medium 
size performance and sport events will not cover the high rental fee. The “Bird Nest” hosts 
annual recreational sport event, the “Bird Nest” Snow Festival (Figure 18), and occasional 
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concerts and performances, but it is far to being profitable. All events the stadiums stage are 
short-term events that barely generate long-term, stable cash flows (Shen 2014). 
Figure 18. The annual “Bird Nest” Snow Festival 
Photographed by the author 
 	  	  
Conclusion 
The Beijing 2008 Olympics was planned to enhance and address the city’s master plan, 
accelerating urban development of its metropolitan area. However, it may not have much 
impact on the city’s urban development- Beijing was heading toward it anyway, with or 
without the Olympics. The 2008 Olympic legacies are the most beneficial to the city but less 
so to the local community, as the mega-event failed to site the venues in the area that most 
requires economic incentives from the government. The planning process excluded public 
participation, with the Municipal Planning Commission as the only player. Another problem 
caused in the planning process is the out-of-scale superblocks with new uses that do not 
necessarily target at local residents.  
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The site is troubled by post-Olympic effect: the under-performing of on-site retailers and 
the stagnated local businesses. Despite that the surrounding franchised businesses were 
thriving, on-site commercial spaces are having a difficulty recruiting tenants. Local 
businesses owners in the surrounding neighborhoods are not able to reach out to the growing 
population of day-trippers and tourists.  
On-site transportation infrastructure was largely improved, but does not necessarily 
benefit the local residents. A road network that is supposed to alleviate the traffic pressure of 
the arterial road nearby is closed to private vehicles, leaving the traffic condition around the 
Olympic Green not much better than before 2008. The greatest improvement is the 
construction of subway lines that connect districts of the city and regional transport hubs. But 
it may not be solely related to the Olympics because the city was pushing forward public 
transportation agenda since the late 1990s.  
The massive scale of open space and the low usage rates of stadiums are problematic 
although the site provided valuable open space in the busy central city. An unfriendly 




It is highly recommended that, during the application phase, the IOC should emphasize 
the post-Olympic agenda by pushing candidate cities to come up with feasible post-Olympic 
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plans. The IOC could organize short-term and long-term analysis reports on previous host 
cities, which could be 2 years and 5 years after the Games. Keeping records of past hosts’ 
post-Olympic performance informs the IOC and future candidates of good practices, thus 
alleviating the impacts and maximizing the benefits brought about by the mega-event.  
In the case of Beijing 2008 Olympics, the Municipal Planning Commission was majorly 
responsible for the planning. Due to the highly centralized planning power, suggestions are 
proposed to the municipal government and its planning department. Recommendations are 
divided into three categories: plan for disaggregation, reusing the stadiums, and creating 
community benefits (Figure 19). The recommendations address the problems imposed by the 
2008 Olympics and aim at promoting local benefits. 
Figure 19. Possible suggestions to the municipal government of Beijing 
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Plan for Disaggregation 
One of the problems of the 2008 Olympics planning is the superblocks that are 
completely out-of-context. Visually, there is a clear boundary between the Olympic site and 
surrounding neighborhoods with drastically contrasting looks of buildings. Physically, fenced 
against the adjacent neighborhoods, the Olympic Green forms a huge space that blocks the 
traffic, lacks locally beneficial functions (except for the open space) and does not provide a 
comfortable walking experience.  
The municipal government should have planned for sellable parcels that could be sold to 
the private owners after the Games. Although it is argued by Mr. Sun from BIAD that the city 
occasionally needs vast open space for big events such as the installation of an art exhibition, 
the case is rare and the Bird Nest, with its surrounding spaces, can easily accommodate such 
events. The city could have planned the rest of the Olympic Green into parcels that could be 
taken apart when it does not need to be unnecessarily big. When the city no longer needs the 
space, the land entitlement of each individual parcel could be sold to private owners who 
could better cope with the market.  
The benefits are obvious: selling unneeded parcels to the private sector helps with 
vitalizing the local economics. Looking back to the thriving franchised businesses around the 
venues and the highly vacant on-site commercial space owned by the public contractor, 
Inno-Olympic, selling the land entitlement to the private companies might help the site 
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generate more profits, thus increasing the local tax base. Due to the public ownership of the 
land, assigning private contractors could be difficult. As a temporary alternative, the 
Inno-Olympic could introduce public-private partnerships in operation of the parcels: the 
private sector runs the businesses while the Inno-Olympic owns the land entitlement and 
monitors the operation. 
Another benefit is that, by disaggregating the site, the scale of the space is downsized 
and the impacts of the massiveness can therefore be dismissed. To preserve a reasonable 
portion of open space on each parcel, the city could require that each private buyer retain 
certain areas as desirable public open space and add properly designed street furniture. 
Provision of seats is highly recommended. For the open space in the southern portion near 
Bird Nest, where massive scale might be useful, more uses could be added to the empty open 
spaces such as weekly local farm market. 
Smaller scale spaces with properly installed street furniture could also enhance 
walkability on-site and around the Olympic Green, which could benefit the local businesses. 
Poor pedestrian environment hinders visitors from going off-site, thus constraining all 
benefits on-site. A friendly walking environment could introduce visitors to the surrounding 
neighborhoods, encouraging them to spend money on locally owned businesses. 
Sidewalks should be integrated into a network instead of scattered around the site. 
Medians and safe islands in the middle of the roads should be implemented in a friendlier 
manner (for example: providing street furniture). In addition, the intersections could have 
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shorter intervals between red and green lights, making it easier for pedestrians to cross. This 
may result in slower traffic flows, thus should be considered together with alleviation of the 
traffic by opening more roads to private vehicles. 
Finally, disaggregation of land parcels alleviates the traffic pressure. The Olympic Green 
is currently fenced against private vehicles. The on-site roads are planned to be integrated 
into the city’s street grid but have not been opened yet for security reasons. If the Olympic 
Green was planned to be taken apart after 2008, the on-site roads could welcome private 
vehicles, alleviating the traffic on arterial roads surrounding the site. The opening-up could 
be in phases, accompanying the purchase of land parcels. The city could also open up the 
aboveground collecting roads in early phases and the underground circuit in later phases. 
 
Plan for Reusing the Stadiums 
The current venues are having difficulty living on the incomes from entrance fees and 
big event rental fees. The stadiums are either too big to be used by small and medium events 
or too “nationalized” to stage local sport games. Lack of long-term users leaves the stadium 
in a tough situation where they cannot find stable income sources that support the high 
maintenance and operation expenses. 
There are two ways to ease the financial pressure: one is to design the stadiums as 
“shrinkable”; the other one is to open stadiums to citizens. A “shrinkable” stadium is one that 
can be partly demolished after serving its purpose. The Bird Nest could accommodate as 
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many as 100,000 people during the Beijing Olympics and 80,000 after the Games. The 
stadium has been rarely full since 2008. If, during the planning phases, the city could have 
applied a design that enabled the stadiums to downscale itself, it could largely reduce the 
maintenance and operational expenses, therefore minimizing the rental fees. It would not 
only cut down costs but also welcome more users when they are not intimidated by the high 
rental fees.  
The stadiums could be used for various activities. If open to local residents, the spaces 
inside stadiums could be used for sport and recreational purposes such as community 
meetings and small-scale local art performances. The city can sign long-term contracts with 
local communities and private groups to cover the expenses. The stadiums are envisioned as 
national level sport facilities, which prevent them from being rented by city and region sport 
teams. However, if the stadiums could be used for local and regional sport events, it could 
considerably increase the usage rates and financial profits. The stadiums could be 
self-sufficient by introducing local users.	  
 
Create Community Benefits 
The city could have planned for uses that could bring more benefit to the local residents. 
The China National Convention Center and the Confucius Education Center under 
construction mainly attract day-trippers. The National Convention Center is not open to local 
users, who live in the neighboring residential area and could visit the site most frequently. 
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Instead of merely introducing large-scale institutional and commercial uses, the Municipal 
Planning Commission could have mixed them with small retailing spaces and sport facilities 
that are more desired by the local residents. 
Another way of creating community benefits, and probably a more efficient way, is leave 
the negotiation to private buyers of land parcels and local residents. Instead of being the 
decision maker, the city’s (and its planners) role becomes a provider of a platform where the 
private sector and the local residents together work out a community benefit agreement that 
decides what are the givebacks and what uses the residents desire. Planners, and the Beijing 
municipal government should offer consulting services to local residents, encouraging their 
efforts to strengthen local businesses and inspiring them of innovative ways to do so. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1. Location of Beijing 2008 Olympics Venues 
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Figure 3. Land use map of Chaoyang District and the planned commercial centers 
Source: the Beijing Master Plan: land use map of central city (2004-2020) 
	  
  
 	  	  	  	  
40	  
Figure 5. Beijing-Tianji-Hebei Urban Development Corridor 
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Figure 6. Land use map of Walicun (2001) 
Data source: Google Earth
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Figure 7. Land use map of the Olympic Green (2014) 
Data source: Beijing 2008 International Competition for Landscaping of Forest Park and Central Zone in 
Olympic Green, Google Earth.
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Figure 8. Site plan of the Olympic Green (by Sasaki Architects) 
Source: Sasaki Architects:  
http://www.sasaki.com/project/96/2008-beijing-olympics/ 
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Figure 14. Beijing subway lines (2001) 
Data source: Beijing subway official site: bjsubway.com 
	  
 
Figure 16. Beijing subway lines (2010) 
Data source: Beijing subway official site: bjsubway.com 
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